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I. INTRODUCJ'ION

Probably the most widely noted Supreme Court decision of the
Court's 2002-2003 term was Lawrence v. Texas.1 In Lawrence, the Court
held that a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy was
unconstitutional. 2 The decision overruled the Court's 1986 decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick,3 which upheld a Georgia statute that on its face
criminalized all sodomy, both heterosexual and homosexual, but focused
almost entirely on the statute as applied to homosexual behavior.4 Five of
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; B.A., Fordham University, 1973;
J.D., New York University School of Law, 1976; LL.M., Temple University School of
Law, 1983.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
1.
2.
Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 578 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
3.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1, 192. The Georgia statute
4.
challenged in Bowers provided: "A person commits the offense of sodomy when he
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984), quoted in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1. Justice White's opinion for the Court, however,
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the six justices in the Lawrence majority relied on the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment;5 the sixth, Justice O'Connor, invoked the
6
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
From the day it was decided, Lawrence has attracted an enormous
amount of commentary, both in scholarly journals and the popular media.7
One might ask, with considerable justification, why yet another article
about the case and its implications could be expected to add anything of
value to the literature. A large majority of the commentary on Lawrence
has focused, quite unsurprisingly, on its implications for the further
evolution of the law with respect to the rights of gays and lesbians., While
these questions may be the most immediate ones presented by the decision,
the underlying rationale behind Lawrence has potentially wider
implications.
Not that long ago it was common for lawyers to assume that
constitutional rights claims could be disposed of by placing the claim at
issue into one of two, or perhaps three, categories.' Once this was done,
the rest was easy: two of the categories, claims entitled to "strict scrutiny"
and those entitled to mere "low-level scrutiny," would lead to essentially
automatic results. 10 If a claim was one that subjected the government to
strict scrutiny, the claim would succeed; if it subjected the statute or
government practice to low-level scrutiny, the government would prevail.1'
The third category, claims calling for the courts to apply
"intermediate scrutiny," was far less determinate,12 but because that
balancing test was reserved for only a few types of cases, it did not seem to

characterized the respondent's argument as asking the Court to "announce .

.

. a

fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at
191.
5.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 564.
6.
Id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7.
See generally Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of
Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1399-1401 (2004) (noting the comments
of advocacy groups and gay rights scholars); Lawrence v. Texas Symposium, 46 S. TEX.
L. REV. 245 (2004) (discussing the legal ramifications of and history behind the
Lawrence decision).
8.
See generally Robyn Wiegman, Comment, Queer Theory, Feminism, and
the Law, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 93 (2004).
9.
Donald L. Beschle, Kant's CategoricalImperative: An Unspoken Factorin
ConstitutionalRights Balancing,31 PEPP. L. REV. 949, 958-59 (2004).
10.
Id.
11,
Id.
12.
Id.
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complicate the analysis that much. 3 The creation of the third category was
perhaps the first clear indication that the Supreme Court was becoming
dissatisfied with the apparent all-or-nothing approach presented by the
other two options.
Lawrence is one of several recent cases indicating that the certainty of
the dichotomy between strict scrutiny and low-level scrutiny is breaking
down. 14 The breakdown of the familiar dichotomy between constitutional
claims deserving strict scrutiny and those entitled only to low-level review
shifts the focus of analysis from trying to weigh the importance of the right
asserted by the individual to the strength of the government's justification
for the challenged statute.15 When the challenge is to a criminal
prohibition, the individual's liberty is, by definition, at stake. Until
recently, careful review, indeed any meaningful review, of the substantive
unless a narrow
legitimacy of criminal statutes was essentially nonexistent
16
category of "fundamental rights" were implicated.
Lawrence, however, strongly suggests that this will no longer be the
case. The mere enactment of a criminal statute will be insufficient to
establish that it is not an arbitrary act, and is therefore a violation of due
process. At the same time, however, we can expect that the vast majority
of criminal statutes will easily satisfy substantive due process review.
Critics of Lawrence, most notably Justice Scalia, have warned that it
threatens a wide range of criminal prohibitions, and that its analysis has no
logical stopping point. 7 Is this really the case?
If Lawrence is not confined to its facts, and to the specific question of
the due process rights of gays and lesbians, a framework for determining
just how far its reasoning alters current analysis must be developed.
Perhaps just as important is to explain how Lawrence does not give courts a
license to overturn a wide range of criminal statutes, but rather only holds
legislatures, in a meaningful way, to the requirement of rationality. This
13.
See id. at 959 (noting that the Supreme Court has refused to apply
intermediate scrutiny in cases involving affirmative action, but arguing that "the
intermediate scrutiny test has sometimes been applied in ways that seem quite similar
to traditional strict scrutiny, further blurring the distinction") (footnote omitted).
14.
See discussion infra notes 103-28 and accompanying text.
15.

ERWIN

CHEMERINSKY,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW:

PRINCIPLES

AND

POLICIES § 9.2, at 651-59 (2d ed. 2002).

See discussion infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
16.
17.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Court's decision calls into question "[s]tate laws against bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
bestiality, and obscenity").
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Article attempts to provide a framework and explanation, by drawing
heavily on the work of Joel Feinberg, who attempted to articulate a
comprehensive liberal analysis of the moral basis of criminal punishment. 18
If this analysis is valid, Lawrence may be seen in the future as having a
significance far beyond its obvious implications for homosexual rights.

II. LAWRENCE AND ITS PREDECESSORS
To fully understand Lawrence, it is necessary to understand its
predecessor, Bowers v. Hardwick.19 Lawrence not only overruled Bowers,20
it is in several respects almost a perfectly reversed mirror image of the
earlier decision. In Bowers, the Court addressed a Georgia statute that
criminalized sodomy, whether engaged in by heterosexuals or
homosexuals."1 In Lawrence, the Texas statute in question prohibited only
22
homosexual sodomy.
Nevertheless, the Bowers opinion addressed homosexual sodomy
only.23 This may be attributed to the fact that the challenge to the statute
was brought by gay plaintiffs, 24 but may also reflect the reluctance of the
Bowers majority to risk defection if the opinion, in apparent tension with
earlier cases dealing with sexual intimacy, 25 were to explicitly uphold
18.
1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS (1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS); 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985) [hereinafter
FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS]; 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF]; 4
JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
WRONGDOING (1988) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING].

HARMLESS

19.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
20.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578.
21.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188.
22.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 563. The statutory provision at issue in
Lawrence provided: "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). "Deviate sexual intercourse" was defined as "(A) any contact
between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an
object." Id. § 21.01(1), quoted in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 563.

23.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 ("The issue presented is whether the

Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy....").
24.
Id. at 188-89.
25.
Id. at 190. The Court stated as follows:
We first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with
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prohibitions on heterosexual sodomy.
While the Bowers opinion treated a sexual orientation neutral statute
as if it dealt only with homosexual activity,26 the Lawrence majority, with
the exception of concurring Justice O'Connor, 7 dealt with a statute
targeting gays by invalidating all sodomy statutes, regardless of their
scope. 28 Thus, while the immediate and most obvious beneficiaries of the
decision were homosexuals, the implications of the decision reach much
further, and, in fact, are not clearly limited to matters involving sexual
conduct.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy begins analysis of the issue by
reviewing the Court's modern history of substantive due process holdings.2 9
He detailed how Griswold v. Connecticut3 established that a "right to
respondent that the Court's prior cases have construed the Constitution to
confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy ....The reach of
this line of cases [has included rights] dealing with child rearing and education;
with family relationships; with procreation; with marriage; with contraception;
and with abortion ....
Accepting the decisions in those cases ... we think it evident that none of the
rights announced in these cases bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted
in this case. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated ....
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the majority's narrow focus
26.
on homosexual activity despite the broad language of the Georgia statute).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27.
Justice O'Connor relied on the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Due Process
Clause: "Moral disapproval of [a] group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause." Id.
Id. at 574-75 (Kennedy, J.). The plurality reasoned:
28.
As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some
amici contend that Romer v. Evans provides the basis for declaring the Texas
statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument,
but we conclude the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself
has continuing validity. Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if
drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and
different-sex participants.
Id.

29.

Id. at 564-66.

30.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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privacy" was entitled to constitutional protection, and did so by focusing
"on the marriage relation and the protected space of the marital
bedroom."'3' In Eisenstadt v. Baird,32 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons.3 3 While the Eisenstadt court focused on "the decision whether to
bear or beget a child," 34 drawing the case within the Griswold line,35 Justice
as involving
Kennedy characterized Eisenstadt, with some justification,36 '37
"the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct.
Roe v. Wade38 and other cases 39 followed, reaffirming and extending
the scope of the privacy right, but Bowers refused to extend protection to
homosexual activity. 40 A five-justice majority determined that history and
tradition demonstrated no recognition of such activity as worthy of special
neither strict nor any form of heightened
protection and, therefore,
41
scrutiny was called for.

Perhaps most significant for what was to follow in Lawrence,
however, was the Bowers majority's brief analysis of the issue presented
under the low-level scrutiny of the "rational basis" test.4 2 The Court found

that traditional morality condemned homosexual activity, and the
translation of traditional moral rules into criminal sanctions satisfied the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
Griswold).
36.
the obvious

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 564-65.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 440-43.
Id. at 453.
See id. at 453-54 (analyzing the statute at issue in Eisenstadt in light of
The emphasis in Eisenstadt on the potential for childbirth seems to ignore
point that the state is not compelling anyone to risk bearing a child, but

only seeking to eliminate the possibility of unmarried couples engaging in sexual
activity free from the risk of pregnancy. Justice Kennedy's characterization of
Eisenstadt seems quite justified.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 565.
37.
38.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39.
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-75 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(protecting the right of parents to make decisions concerning their children's
upbringing); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 869 (1992) (reaffirming
and redefining the scope of a woman's abortion right before viability); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) (protecting the right to live with extended
family members).
40.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
41.
Id. at 191-96.
See id. at 196 (devoting one paragraph to an application of the rational
42.
basis test).
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requirement that government must have a legitimate purpose when
the
infringing upon a person's liberty interest, and the requirement that
43
government action have a rational relationship to satisfy that interest.
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy reviewed the history of AngloAmerican law with respect to homosexuality, finding it to be somewhat
more complex than the unambiguous condemnation outlined by the Court
in Bowers.44 Still, the Court did not go so far as to label consensual adult
sexual activity, either heterosexual or homosexual, as a fundamental right45
calling for the protection afforded by the application of strict scrutiny.
Instead, "the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the
most private of places, the home," was described as "a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law,
is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
46
criminals."
Since Griswold, substantive due process cases have generally focused
on whether the conduct at issue qualified for recognition as a fundamental
right.47 The failure of a claimant to establish the existence of a
Id. ("The law.., is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
43.
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process
Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.").
44.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-70 (2003). The Court explained that
early American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but
instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally ....

... Instead of targeting relations between consenting adults in private,
19th-century sodomy prosecutions typically involved relations between men
and minor girls or minor boys, relations between adults involving force,
relations between adults implicating disparity in status, or relations between
men and animals....

...[I]nfrequency [of prosecution] makes it difficult to say that society
approved of a rigorous and systematic punishment of the consensual acts
committed in private and by adults.

Id.
45.

See id. at 567.

46.

Id.

47.

See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (finding no

fundamental right to assisted suicide); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (finding a
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fundamental right would almost invariably mean that the substantive due
process claim would fail; the Court felt no need to discuss classifications48
beyond the dichotomy of fundamental rights and non-fundamental rights.
In cases involving procedural due process claims, the language and analysis
were different. In order to warrant consideration of a claim of deprivation
of procedural due process, one did not need to establish a fundamental
right was at stake, but merely that the government was interfering with
liberty or property. 49 Of course, this did not mean that the claim would
succeed, but it would require the Court to balance the interests at stake to
some degree, 0 rather than simply accepting the procedures provided by the
5
state as adequate. '

fundamental right to abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding that
the right to marry is a fundamental right).
48.
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (finding no
fundamental right of a natural father to establish paternity of a child conceived with
another man's wife); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191 (refusing to recognize "a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy"); Village of Belle Terre v. Borass,
416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974) (noting there is no fundamental right of unrelated people to live
together).
49.
See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-76 (1975) (treating reputation
as a liberty interest and "a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education a
property interest"); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding a property
interest in "a teacher ... who has held his position for a number of years [as granting] a
legitimate claim for job tenure"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970)
(finding a property interest in continuation of public assistance payments).
50.
The balancing test applied in procedural due process cases was set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews balancing test provides that
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
51.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the
Court rejected the argument that a state could successfully argue that a set of
inadequate termination procedures could be incorporated into the definition of a
public employee's property right. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
539-41. In an earlier case, the Court suggested that the government could avoid the
need for any procedural requirements in dismissing an employee by making it clear at
the outset that the employee had no procedural rights. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 356 (1976) (noting that "continued public employment ... can exist only if the
employer, by statute or contract, has actually granted some form of guarantee").
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In recent years, the language of "liberty interest" or "claim of liberty"
has begun to appear in the Court's substantive due process decisions, as
well as those involving procedural claims.5 2 In procedural cases, having
one's claim labeled a liberty interest is at least a partial victory. But,
somewhat ironically, the language of liberty interests began to appear in
substantive due process opinions of those justices opposed to the extension
of the privacy right. 3 Justices opposed to the extension or reaffirmation of4
Roe v. Wade would refer to a liberty interest in reproductive decisions.1
While this designation would seem to concede that the Due Process Clause
was relevant to the claim before the Court, it also marked the claim as one
entitled to something less than strict scrutiny analysis, with that test
reserved for cases involving only the narrow category of fundamental
rights. The recognition of liberty interests as presenting a genuine due
process issue, however, is a double-edged sword. If it can be wielded as a
weapon to reduce constitutional protection, as in the abortion cases, it can
also be used to increase that protection, as in Lawrence. A full
understanding of the issues inherent in substantive due process claims will
require that we go back beyond the Griswold line of privacy cases, to the
early years of the Court's consideration of these claims.
The central demand of the Due Process Clause, in its analysis of the
substance of prohibitory legislation, is that such legislation is not arbitrary
or irrational.55 Much of the history of substantive due process involves the
Court's attempt to define one or more standards for determining just when

See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (stating that "[a]
52.
woman's decision to conceive or to bear a child is a component of her liberty that is
protected by the Due Process Clause"); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 278-79 (1990) (characterizing the right to refuse medical treatment not as a
fundamental right, but rather, a "liberty interest" requiring balancing of interests);
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (plurality opinion)
("[T]here is wisdom in not unnecessarily attempting to elaborate the abstract
differences between a 'fundamental right' to abortion . . . a 'limited fundamental
constitutional right,' . . . or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause,
which we believe it to be.") (citations omitted).
53.
See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (referring to Roe's "liberty interest").
54.
See, e.g., id.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-1, at 1333
55.
(3d ed. 2000) ("By 1855, in any event, the Supreme Court was treating as implicit in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment the requirement that, to qualify as 'law,'
an enactment would have to meet substantive requirements of rationality, nonoppressiveness, and even-handedness."); see also Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due
Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 941, 948-58 (tracing the Due Process Clause to the
Magna Carta, which prohibited arbitrary action by the king).
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a legislature has crossed the line into irrationality.5 6 This debate dates back
to the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 57 now considered
a significant judicial misstep, but still the starting point in the history of
substantive due process.
Lochner produced three opinions, each working from the premise
that due process of law includes the requirement that the government not
act in an arbitrary irrational manner, but each differs significantly on the
question of how rigorous the proper test for rationality should be.58 Two of
the three opinions are well known, and have been the source of much
subsequent jurisprudential thought. 59 The third, which has been somewhat
overlooked for a long while, however, seems to, consciously or not, provide
the antecedent for some recent Supreme Court analysis, including
Lawrence.60
The definition of a legitimate restriction on liberty, all of the Lochner
justices would agree, is a restriction that furthers the states' "police
power. '61 This term includes not merely crime prevention, the most
common use of the word "police" today, but refers to the promotion of the
A
morals, health, safety, and general welfare of the community. 62

56.
See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base
Plus Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice,4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 258-59
(2002) (cataloging the array of tests the Court has enunciated).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
57,
58.
See id.at 64 (Peckham, J.) ("We are justified in [declaring a law
unconstitutional] when, from the character of the law and the subject upon which it
legislates, it is apparent that the public health or welfare bears the most remote relation
to the law."); id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating the standard as whether "there is
... [a] real or substantial relation between the means employed by the state and the
end sought to be accomplished by its legislation"); id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(concluding the test should be whether a rational and fair man would "admit that the
statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law").
See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
59.
60.
See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
61.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 53 (Peckham, J.) ("Both property and
liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed ... in the exercise of
[a state's governing] powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth Amendment was
not designed to interfere."); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that "the existence
of [the police] power [of the state] has been uniformly recognized"); id. at 76 (Holmes,
J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that because the law at issue could be viewed by a reasonable
man as "a proper measure on the score of health," it is a proper exercise of
governmental power).
62.
Id. at 53.
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community's general welfare might be contrasted with the promotion of
private gain, at the expense of the welfare of all, or perhaps more
for the sake of the
obviously, an action that seeks to disadvantage some
63
disadvantage itself, with no resulting benefit to all.
The principle that restrictions on liability should be justified as
genuine efforts to promote the general welfare sounds unobjectionable in
the abstract, but its application, of course, is far from simple. Much,
perhaps most, legislation has different degrees of impact on different
groups and individuals; yet at the same time, its motivation and effect
clearly reflects concern for the welfare of the entire community. How can
we recognize when this is not the case, and, perhaps more importantly, who
has the authority to make that decision?
A tradition that has become known as "civic republican" saw the
ideal state as one in which a virtuous public, through its representatives,
would reject "faction," or private gain, in favor of the general welfare. 64 A
rival tradition maintains that faction and self interest are inevitable aspects
of government, and that structures should be created to limit the ability of
dominant factions to act contrary to the general welfare. 6 Each tradition
seeks to promote the general welfare, but will lead to different approaches
to answering the question of who is in the best position to assess whether
legislation is legitimate. When kings or a small elite were legislators, their
obvious ability to act in their own self-interest, or perhaps on a whim,
might require an outside arbiter. In a working democracy, though, are not
the people's elected representatives, at least presumptively, the body best
equipped to determine what is or is not in furtherance of the general
welfare? Or must there be a strong check on the majority's ability to prefer
its own welfare to that of the entire community?

See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (stating
63.
that a law that summarily "takes property from A. and gives it to B .... is against all
reason and justice," and, thus, "cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative
authority").
64.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713,
1713 (1988) (describing the civic republican ideal as "[c]ollective self-determination by
political equals, animated by civic virtue to seek a common good").
65.
Skepticism about the ability of those holding power to put aside selfinterest would lead to the conclusion that the best way to promote the general welfare
would be to create a system that assumed the inevitability of factional loyalties, but
assured that no faction could dominate. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, The Missing
Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673, 1674-79 (1988) (discussing the
framers' design of the United States Constitution, which contemplated narrow
partisanship and fashioned a way to cope with it).
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Lochner can be seen as a clash of these two traditions. The majority
opinion saw New York legislation limiting the working hours of bakers as
an infringement of liberty requiring justification by proof of the
regulation's connection to health and safety concerns. 66 Giving essentially
no deference to the legislature, the majority determined that a law limiting
the number of hours a baker could be required to work was unrelated to
"any other portion of the public than those who are engaged in that
occupation," 67 so the legislation could not be justified as an exercise of the
police power. 8 The Court set forth no formula for analyzing substantive
due process cases, but it would seem that the majority saw it as their
responsibility to determine, essentially de novo, whether the legislation was
necessary, and its contribution to the general welfare significant. 9 This
rigorous standard can be seen as the progenitor of the "strict scrutiny" test
that the Court would adopt decades later, first in a limited range of equal
protection cases,70 and later in a new generation of substantive due process
disputes.71 However, at least since the 1940s, strict scrutiny has been the
exception, rather than the standard approach employed in substantive due

66.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 57-58.
67.
Id. at 57; see also id. at 59 (diminishing the protection for workplace
hazard relating to health needs by bakers because even though "the trade of a baker
does not appear to be as healthy as some other trades, [it] is also vastly more healthy
than still others," and has "never been regarded as an unhealthy one").
68.
Id. at 57-64.
69.
See id. at 62 (holding that a law restricting the number of hours a baker
can work is not necessary to insure "cleanliness on the part of the workers," and, in
turn, a healthy product); id. at 62-63 (holding that if a suspect argument is needed to
justify a law a "health law," "it gives rise to at least a suspicion that there was some
other motive dominating the legislature than the purpose to subserve the public health
or welfare").
70.
Strict scrutiny in cases involving racial discrimination was first articulated
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Ironically, this is one of two
Supreme Court decisions in which the Court held that a government act expressly
disadvantaging a minority racial group satisfied this test. See id. at 223-24; Joseph C.
Fetterman, Affirmative Action Hiring Obligations: Is It Time for a Race-NeutralPolicy
or a Race to the Court House?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 781, 793 (2004) (citing Korematsu
and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), as the only such cases). Both
cases, now widely regarded as embarrassing errors by the Court, upheld the wartime
evacuation and detention of Japanese-Americans on the West Coast.
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938),
Justice Stone singled out statutes showing "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities" as situations in which the Court should not show great deference to
legislative judgment.
71.
See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
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process cases.72
Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner can be seen as the polar opposite
of the majority opinion, yet it starts from the same premise: the Due
Process Clause demands that an infringement of liberty be justified as
rationally related to the general welfare.73 Holmes, however, skeptical of
judges' ability to discern public welfare from private gain as he was of
legislatures', argued for a high degree of deference to legislative
judgment. 74 Except in cases where reasonable people simply could not fail
to see that the challenged legislation bore no relation to the community's
constitutional prohibition, a
welfare or cases that violated an express
75
substantive due process claim should fail.
Holmes's deferential standard can be seen as the progenitor of the
low-level "rational basis" test that came to be applied in many equal
protection cases and most substantive due process cases from the 1940s on.
The Supreme Court's repudiation of Lochner itself,76 and its severe
limitation of the types of cases in which it would be proper to show little or
no deference to the legislature,77 led the Court to approach most
substantive due process claims as Lochner's severest critic, Justice Holmes,
would.
Almost every graduate of an American law school in the past half-

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorization
72.
and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992).
Holmes would ask whether "a rational and fair man necessarily would
73.
admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law." Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
74.
See id. (arguing that "the word liberty, in the Fourteenth Amendment, is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,"
unless that opinion "infringe[s] fundamental principles").
See id.
75.
Without expressly overruling Lochner, the Supreme Court put an end to
76.
strict scrutiny of economic regulation in the 1930s and 1940s. See, e.g., West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage
legislation applicable only to women and minors); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
516-17 (1934) (upholding state price regulation for milk).
77.
Justice Stone's influential footnote four in Carolene Products suggested
that in addition to instances where a discrete and insular minority was being singled out
for disadvantage, strict scrutiny might be applied where the challenged "legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution," or "restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
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century is at least somewhat familiar with these two opinions in Lochner,
and with the contrasting approaches of strict or low-level scrutiny that grew
out of them. For much of that time, constitutional rights litigation, at least
those cases involving equal protection or substantive due process claims,
could be seen as almost entirely a matter of classification of the claim into
one of only two available categories. A limited number of cases would be
entitled to strict scrutiny; the application of that test was regarded as
essentially guaranteeing invalidation of the challenged statute. 8 Claims
not so classified would be entitled only to rational basis review. A
Holmesian level of deference would essentially guarantee that the
government would prevail.7 9 In short, the true battleground was the
decision regarding which test to apply. Application itself was almost
automatic: under strict scrutiny the claimant won, and under rational basis
review the claim failed. These alternatives were the only available options.
Yet the Lochner Court itself did present a third alternative. Justice
Holmes wrote only for himself, yet Lochner was a five-to-four decision. 0
Justice Harlan, writing for himself and two colleagues, also dissented,"l but
did not go so far as Holmes in his level of deference."' While Justice
Holmes found it unnecessary to do more than assert that legislators who
could not be described as irrational enacted the legislation,8 3 Justice Harlan
cited evidence that, in fact, the health of bakery workers was endangered
by excessively long work hours.8 At the same time, Justice Harlan did not
require that the supporters of the legislation bear a burden of proof

78.
virtually any
79.
"the right of
80.
81.

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.2, at 601 ("The reality is that
law can meet this very deferential requirement.").
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 75 (deferring, in most cases, to
a majority to embody their opinions in law").
See id. at 65 (5-4 decision); id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan was joined by Justices White and Day. See id. at 65-74

(Harlan, J., dissenting).
82.
Compare id. at 65-66 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State in the exercise
of its powers may not unduly interfere with the right of the citizen to enter into
contracts that may be necessary and essential in the enjoyment of inherent rights
belonging to every one" unless .'the contracts of business conflict with the policy of the

State as contained in its statutes."') (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589
(1897)), with id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (deferring to "the right of a majority
to embody their opinions in law," unless "a rational and fair man necessarily would
admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law").
83.,
[d. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

84.

Id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 53 Drake L. Rev. 244 2004-2005

20051

Lawrence Beyond Gay Rights

regarding the need or efficacy of the restriction.85 Justice Harlan, like
Justice Holmes 86 and the Lochner majority, 87 failed to clearly articulate a
particular standard for determining whether a statute is rational or
arbitrary.8 8 But his approach is clearly somewhere between the alternatives
set forth by his colleagues. While avoiding the nearly automatic deference
of Justice Holmes,8 9 Justice Harlan does not require the legislature to
Instead, he requires some evidence justifying the
convince him.90
restriction, not merely the fact of its adoption. 91 A rough analogy may be
made to the law of evidence. While the Lochner majority would place a
burden of proof on the state to justify its action, 92 Justice Harlan merely
requires that the state bear the burden of going forward and producing
some modicum of evidence in support of the action. 93 Having done so, the
state has earned deference.
The approach of Justice Harlan, one which would grant substantial,
but not total deference to legislative judgment, did not achieve the
prominence of either the opinion of the Lochner majority or Justice
Holmes's dissent. Indeed, Harlan's approach would largely disappear as
subsequent decades saw the debate between advocates and opponents of
judicial activism struggle for supremacy. A middle ground would fully
satisfy neither side, and it would also have the drawback of being perceived
as insufficiently determinate. In contrast, the alternatives of strict or lowlevel scrutiny that emerged in the decades after Lochner provided a sense
of determinacy in their application, even if their approach masked a
significant degree of indeterminacy in resolving the initial question of

85.
See id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("If there be doubt as to the validity
of the statute, that doubt must.. . be resolved in favor of its validity.").
86.
See id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87.
See id. at 53-55.
88.
See id. at 68-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89.
See id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
90.
See id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91.
Id. at 72-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92.
Id. at 57-58 (requiring an "act [to] have a more direct relation, as a means
to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be
held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in her
person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor").
93.
See id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding it "plain" that the "statute
was enacted in order to protect the physical well-being of those who work in bakery
and confectionary establishments," thus finding it "impossible ... to say that there is
here no real or substantial relation between the means employed by the State and the
end sought to be accomplished by its legislation").
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which test to apply. 94 The Harlan opinion, however, demonstrates that
there has always been an available middle ground between no deference
and total deference available to the Court, and the desirability of such a
middle ground would become apparent in the last three decades of the
95
twentieth century.
The search for a middle ground would take at least two different
forms. The first would appear in equal protection cases in which the
plaintiff was a member of a class that had some, but arguably not enough
resemblance to racial or ethnic minorities sufficient to entitle that class to
invoke strict scrutiny where government acts singled them out
disadvantageously. 6 If it could be said that racial distinctions were
essentially never rationally related to the general welfare and distinctions
based on factors such as age quite often were, 97 how should courts deal with
something like gender? On the one hand, no one could doubt that the law
had a long history of making gender distinctions based only on indefensible
stereotypes. 98 On the other, meaningful differences between the sexes,
unlike racial differences, might sometimes justify disparate treatment.
Thus, after some false starts,99 the Supreme Court forged a third standard
for equal protection analysis, one which has become known as intermediate
scrutiny. 10o

94.

"The rational basis test is enormously deferential to the government."

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 6.5, at 518. Strict scrutiny has been described as "'strict

in theory and fatal in fact."' Id., at 520 (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)).
95.
See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
96.
See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 457, 461-64 (1988) (holding that
intermediate scrutiny should be applied to a Pennsylvania law requiring a paternity suit
to "be brought within six years of an illegitimate child's birth").
97.
See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (holding
that age classifications require only low-level scrutiny).
98.
See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60, 65 (1961) (upholding a Florida
statute granting women automatic exemption from jury service unless they specifically
waived it); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a Michigan statute
prohibiting, with narrow exceptions, women from employment as bartenders);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (upholding an Illinois statute denying
women the right to be licensed as attorneys).
99.
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (endorsing, by
a four-justice plurality, strict scrutiny as the appropriate test for gender discrimination
claims); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (using rational basis test to strike
down state statute giving preference to male relatives for appointment as
administrators of estates).
100.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (holding that, under the newly
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Although the intermediate scrutiny standard can be stated succinctly,
its application is far less determinate than earlier standards.',, It might be
fair to conclude, in fact, that "intermediate scrutiny" is merely a label
meant to suggest some degree of precision to what is, in fact, a rather openended balancing test.1 02 Is there enough evidence to refute the notion that
the basis of the statutory classification is irrational stereotyping? With no
formula available to guide the determination of how much evidence is
enough, courts are free to explore the territory between extreme deference
and extreme skepticism.
Perhaps even more interesting than the Court's attempt to frame one
or more intermediate standards for evaluating Fourteenth Amendment
claims are a number of decisions that challenge the notion that the choice
of either strict scrutiny or the low-level rational basis test will lead to
inevitable results, invalidating the challenged statute in the former
instance, upholding it in the latter. 103 In wrestling with the issue of
affirmative action, the Court has maintained that strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review for all racial classifications, whether those
1°4
classifications work to the advantage or disadvantage of minority groups.
adopted intermediate scrutiny, a lower drinking age for females than males violated
equal protection).
101.
Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996) (holding
that a state-run military academy's practice of excluding women was unconstitutional),
with Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59 (1981) (upholding the practice of requiring
only males to register for a potential military draft). See also Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 466, 472-73 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding statutory rape
law, despite the claim that because only men could be held criminally liable under the
law it was based on impermissible gender stereotypes); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270,
283 (1979) (invalidating, based on gender stereotypes, a state statute which required
husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony following divorce).
102.
Occasionally, a Justice has questioned the view that the strict use of three
different standards is the proper way to approach Fourteenth Amendment cases,
contending that all such cases really call for balancing the public purpose of the
challenged statute against the harm to the disadvantaged claimant. See, e.g., City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I
have never been persuaded that these so-called 'standards' adequately explain the
decisional process."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing "disagreement with the Court's rigidified
approach to equal protection analysis").
103.
See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
104.
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204, 235-36
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute authorizing financial incentives to
contractors on government projects who hire "socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals," where "race-based presumptions" were used to identify such individuals);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-506 (1989) (applying strict
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Yet the "strict scrutiny" applied in these cases has allowed room for
upholding at least some affirmative action programs. 10 The recent pair of
cases in which the Court upheld the affirmative action program used at the
University of Michigan Law School, 10 6 while striking down the program
10 7
employed by the undergraduate program at the same university,
demonstrates an application of strict scrutiny less rigid than that commonly
applied. 108
The same flexibility has begun to appear in cases whose holdings
refute the notion that a statute or government practice will always prevail
when subjected only to low-level scrutiny. In a few instances, the Court
found that when a statutory distinction was based on irrational hostility
toward a particular group, even one not thought of as a classic "suspect
class" for equal protection purposes, that distinction would fail to satisfy
even low-level scrutiny. 10 9 This was true even where plausible reasons
unrelated to hostility could be put forward. 110 For example, saving money
would not justify a classification that excluded households with unrelated
adults from the federal food stamp program, where that exclusion was
apparently motivated by hostility toward "hippie" communal living
arrangements."'
scrutiny to a statute requiring contractors on public construction projects to
subcontract a specific percentage to businesses owned by minorities).
105.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 343 (2003) (upholding the
affirmative action program at the University of Michigan Law School). Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, explained that "[n]ot every decision influenced by
race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context." Id. at 327.
106.
Id. at 343.
107.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003).
108.
Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 328 (stating that deference may
be granted to a university's academic decisions), with, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. at 224-27 (refusing to afford any deference when strict scrutiny
applies).
109.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding state initiative
disadvantaging homosexuals violative of equal protection under rational basis test);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985) (zoning
ordinance disadvantaging mentally disabled held violation of equal protection under
rational basis test); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (holding regulation
excluding unrelated household members from food stamp program violative of equal
protection under rational basis test).
110.
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448-50
(rejecting the government's "legitimate interests" of safety concerns, flooding
concerns, street congestion, and overcrowding).
111.
USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-36, 538.
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The exclusion of group homes for mentally disabled residents from
areas zoned for residential purposes could not be justified by the fact that
the presence of such homes were likely to have a negative effect on
property values in the neighborhood.112 In that case, the Justices who cast
the decisive votes declined to adopt a standard of heightened scrutiny, but
seemed to conclude that even where the likelihood of harm to property
values could be shown, if that harm was the consequence of irrational
prejudice the ordinance could not be deemed rational.1 13 And in a case
foreshadowing Lawrence, the Court held that a state's constitutional
amendment could not be justified merely by the community's hostility 1to4 a
minority group, albeit one not entitled to recognition as a suspect class.
The search for a middle ground between no deference to legislators
and complete deference arose first, and has been seen most frequently, in
equal protection cases. But, prior to Lawrence, some substantive due
process cases also suggested that the Court was dissatisfied with an
analytical model that leaves only those two alternatives, with the choice of
which to follow dependent on the question of whether the claimant seeks
11 5
to protect a fundamental right.
For nearly two decades following Roe v. Wade, the Court dealt with
cases challenging restrictions on abortion in a predictable way." 6 Having
brought the abortion right within the ambit of the fundamental privacy
right recognized in Griswold,"7 the Court struck down any legislation it
viewed as having the slightest effect of placing a burden on an adult
woman's choice to abort prior to the third trimester. 18 Dissenting Justices,
112.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448 ("[M]ere

negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in
a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally
retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.").

113.

Id.

114.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
See infra notes 120-24, 126 and accompanying text.
115.
116.
See cases cited infra note 118.
117.
See supranotes 31-39 and accompanying text.
118.
See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 759-771 (1986) (holding unconstitutional portions of a Pennsylvania statute
requiring the woman to give voluntary and informed consent to an abortion only after
being provided with information could "'influence the woman's informed choice
between abortion or childbirth,"' requiring the physician performing the abortion after
the first trimester to report a basis for determining that a child is not viable in addition
to an extensive amount of other information, requiring a second physician to be
present during the procedure if viability were a possibility, and requiring of the
physician (for post-viability abortions) the degree of care required to preserve the life
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challenging the basic premises of Roe, went to the other extreme,
consistently arguing for a rational basis test that would uphold these
restrictions.' 19

Recent cases, however, have avoided the stark alternatives of
allowing government free rein to limit abortion or alternatively, permitting
no regulation in pursuit of the goal of discouraging abortion. 120 The
"undue burden" test adopted by the Court requires a balancing of
interests, with the state's interest increasing as the term of pregnancy
lengthens, but at no time reaching the point where121either the state's
interest or the woman's right entirely eclipses the other.
of an unborn child not intended to be aborted and the use of a technique providing the
best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive, and not containing an "express
exception for an emergency situation") (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983)); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. at 422-24, 452 (invalidating portions of a city ordinance requiring
"notification and consent by parents before abortions [could] be performed on
unmarried minors," requiring "the attending physician to make ... statements to the
patient to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent," requiring
a "24-hour waiting period between the time the woman signs a consent form and the
time the abortion is performed," and requiring "fetal remains [to] be disposed of in a
humane and sanitary manner") (internal quotation marks omitted); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 624-25, 651 (1979) (plurality opinion) (striking down parental consent
requirement for minor's abortion). The major exception to this pattern was the
Court's sustaining of statutes refusing to extend Medicaid to abortion procedures. See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301, 317-18, 326-27 (1980) (upholding federal statute
denying Medicaid benefits for "certain medically necessary abortions"); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 466, 479-80 (1977) (upholding state statute limiting Medicaid benefits to
only "medically necessary" abortions during the first trimester). These cases held that
while a state could not affirmatively place obstacles in the way of a woman seeking
abortion, the state had no duty to allocate funds equally between abortion and
childbirth.
119.
See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. at 788 (White, J., dissenting) ("In my view, the time has come to recognize that
Roe v. Wade . . . 'departs from a proper understanding' of the Constitution and to
overrule it.") (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557
(1985)).
120.
See e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (indicating that while a woman has a constitutional liberty to terminate her
pregnancy, that liberty is not absolute and must be balanced against the competing
interests of the state).
121.
Id. at 878-89 (outlining the "undue burden" test). The "undue burden"
test was first articulated by Justice O'Connor in dissenting opinions objecting to the
Court's post-Roe extension of the scope of the abortion right. See, e.g., City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 462-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In
Casey, the test became the key analytical tool used by Justices O'Connor, Souter and
Kennedy to affirm the core holding of Roe. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at
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Similarly, in dealing with substantive due process challenges to state
statutes based upon an alleged "right to die," the Court has avoided either
complete deference to legislators, or extreme skepticism. The Court has
recognized a strong right to refuse medical treatment, while at the same
time allowing states leeway to assure that
such a refusal is actually
22
consistent with the true intent of the patient.
And while upholding the state of Washington's prohibition of assisted
suicide, a majority of the Justices, in separate opinions, cautioned that the
individual's interest in being free of pain could not be entirely ignored by
the state. 123 The prohibition would not be read to prohibit palliative care
that might have the secondary effect of hastening death. 24 Just as in the
recent abortion cases, 125 a degree of balancing has appeared in the Court's
26
approach to this substantive due process issue.
A wide range of cases, then, can be seen to illustrate growing
acceptance by the Court of a point raised in separate opinions some years
ago by Justices Stevens and Marshall. 127 There are not two Equal
Protection Clauses, each demanding a different type of analysis. There is
only one, and it requires the Court in each case to balance the gravity of
the harm claimed by the individual against the weight of the government
interest pursued by the challenged legislation. 12 The same insight can be,
129
and has been, applied to recent substantive due process cases.
Balancing will require more than merely labeling a claim as
presenting an issue involving a fundamental right or suspect class, or one
878-89; see also Sternberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000) (striking down
Nebraska's partial birth abortion law using the undue burden test).
122.
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990)
(holding that state may require comatose patient's desire for termination of treatment
be established by clear and convincing evidence). While upholding the Missouri
statute, the Court did indicate that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from [its] prior decisions." Id. at 278.
123.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737-38, 747-48, 784 n.16, 789,
791-92 (1997).
124.
The caveat concerning palliative care appears in the concurring opinions
of Justice O'Connor, id. at 737-38; Justice Stevens, id. at 747-48; Justice Souter, id. at
784 n.16; Justice Ginsberg, id. at 789 (endorsing Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion); and Justice Breyer, id. at 791-92.
125.
See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
126.
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
127.
See supra note 102.
128.
See supra note 102.
129.
See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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lacking such features, and then proceeding to an automatic outcome as a
result of the classification. 3 0 But this does not mean that every case that
requires balancing will present a difficult choice. In some cases, the result
of a balancing test will be fairly clear."' But that result will not be a
consequence of either reflexive deference to the legislature, or of entirely
ignoring the possible existence of legitimate government interests. Instead,
it will be the result of some degree of care in weighing the claims of both
sides.
The Court's analysis in Lawrence, then, can easily be seen as a further
step in the direction of a more open-ended balancing approach to
Fourteenth Amendment cases.
Although the rigidity of the choice
between complete deference and no deference had its obvious weaknesses,
it did provide a significant degree of predictability. Balancing will
inevitably provide less determinacy, and the criticism of balancing in this
regard cannot be entirely ignored. Any regime of balancing will require
some principles or a framework to guide courts and legislatures.
Fortunately, the common-law method of building legal principles case by
case can be expected to be of assistance here. Several of the equal
protection cases discussed above, for example, establish the principle that a
majority's mere hostility toward or fear of a distinct group cannot serve to
justify a statute which disadvantages that group.'32 If Lawrence had been
decided on equal protection grounds, it would have merely reinforced this
principle. By basing the decision instead on due process grounds, the
Court suggests an additional principle to be added to Fourteenth
Amendment balancing, one that will come into play primarily in
substantive due process cases.
We now turn our attention to the
significance of that principle.

130.

On constitutional balancing generally, see Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the

Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudenceof Justice Powell, 97 YALE
L.J. 1 (1987); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987)David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1994).

131.
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1985) (balancing the
police interest in use of deadly force to apprehend an unarmed burglar against a
suspect's interest in preserving his life); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972)
(holding that an unwed father's interest in retaining custody of children upon death of
their mother outweighs a state interest in avoiding the minimal cost of a fitness hearing
by presuming the unfitness of an unwed father).
132.
See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
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III. THE BROADER IMPACT OF LA WRENCE

The Court's use of a balancing test, or if that seems too indeterminate
a term, a "rational basis with teeth" standard, 13 3 as we have seen, is not
entirely unprecedented. The recent, at least occasional, use of such a
standard can be seen as a rediscovery of an approach dating back to Justice
Harlan's dissent in Lochner.'14 But if that is all we could say about
Lawrence and its potential impact beyond its own terms, there would be
little need for commentary. If substantive due process litigation is moving
in the direction of balancing, what does Lawrence tell us about how that
balancing should be carried out?
The first step in addressing this question will be to focus on the
terminology used by the Court to describe what is at stake and to position
what is at stake within the constitutional framework. Any due process
claim, whether categorized as one of procedural or substantive due process,
requires the court to make an initial determination of whether the clause
applies at all. The clause requires the observance of due process when a
state deprives an individual of life, liberty or property. 135 While this would
seem too obvious to deserve mention, it is a point that is obscured in most
substantive due process cases.
Procedural due process cases often dwell on the threshold question of
whether the claimant has demonstrated a deprivation of liberty or property
13 6
and whether, therefore, any procedural safeguards are necessary at all.

The common conception of the rational basis test was that it was
133.
"toothless." See Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 65 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1980) (asserting that "[flor many years," an application of the rational
basis test "was tantamount to declaring that the legislation was constitutional").
134.
See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
135.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
136.
Compare Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 482-83, 488-89 (1980) (moving a
prisoner to a state mental hospital required notice, an adversary hearing, and provision
of counsel prior to the prisoner's relocation because the procedure implicated a liberty
interest), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255, 264. 269-71 (1970) (holding
unconstitutional a state's termination of public assistance payments to a recipient
without an evidentiary hearing on due process grounds because the recipient lacked
alternate income with which to sustain himself), with Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
216, 224-29 (1976) (holding that a prisoner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
before being transferred to a prison "less favorable to the prisoner" because no liberty
interest was implicated), and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 694-95, 699, 712 (1976)
(holding that a police department's circulation of a flyer containing photos of a person
identified as an "active shoplifter," even if it harmed the person's reputation, does not
alone implicate a liberty interest).
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Sometimes the answer to this threshold question is unclear and the debate
contentious. But in many cases, the answer is obvious. Probably the most
obvious cases that bring claimants within the Due Process Clause are
criminal prosecutions. 37 While sharp disagreement may exist as to what
types of procedural protections a criminal defendant must receive, no one
doubts that the defendant is entitled to some. 3 The potential loss of
liberty or property as a result of a criminal conviction is obvious.
Since the revival of substantive due process in Griswold, however, it
has become easy to overlook the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
in cases presenting this type of claim. Since resolution of the question of
whether a claim involved a fundamental right was essentially determinative
of the outcome, it became easy to imagine that, for substantive challenges,
the Due Process Clause protected only fundamental rights. The clause, of
course, makes no distinction between procedural and substantive claims.
The first significant reminder of the scope of the Due Process Clause
in substantive due process cases came, ironically, in the separate opinions
of Justices who sought to narrow the scope of the clause and its protections
in cases involving abortion. 39 The use of the term "liberty interest," rather
140
than "fundamental right," to describe the private interest at stake
suggested strongly that these Justices sought to find a way to severely limit
the abortion right without entirely repudiating cases that held reproductive
freedom to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 41 A mere liberty
interest, unlike a fundamental right, it could be argued, could be trumped

137.
See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("A person's right to
reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in defensea right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights
include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony,
and to be represented by counsel.").

138.

Compare Christopher A. Bracey, Truth and Legitimacy in the American

Process, 90 J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 691 (1999) (advocating for the reduction
of some, but not all procedural protections for accused criminals), with R. Randall
Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to
Constitutional Interpretation in American Law, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 121, 222 (1994)
(noting that Justice Brennan included broad due process rights for criminal hearings as
part of the instrumentalist quest).
139.
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (plurality
opinion); see also id. at 522-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 532-37 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
140.
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 520 (describing the
141,
right created by Roe as a "liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause," and
not a "fundamental right" or a "limited fundamental constitutional right").
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by government satisfaction of a Holmesian rational basis test.142 But at the
same time, the recognition that the Due Process Clause has something to
say about the infringement of liberty that may not fall into a category of
fundamental rights may lead in some instances to more, rather than less
protection.
The first principle implicit in Lawrence, then, is one that should be
rather obvious, but that has been obscured over the years by the Court's
focus on the question of whether a claim invoked a fundamental right.
Any deprivation of liberty requires that the government satisfy the Due
Process Clause. 143 A criminal statute is the classic example of one that
threatens deprivation of liberty. At least a minimal level of due process is
required in any criminal prosecution. No one would argue that this is not
so insofar as it deals with procedural due process, but it is also true with
respect to the substance of the criminal prohibition. 44
A minimum degree of procedural due process includes such things as
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 145 But what is the minimum
standard for assessing the substantive due process of a criminal statute?
Here we can return to Lochner, not to embrace the approach of the
majority, but to focus on the starting point of all of the Justices. As we
have seen, 146 each of the Lochner opinions began its analysis by assuming
that a statute that interfered with liberty must not be arbitrary, or to put it
47
in a more positive form, must be rational.
This point may be illustrated by recalling a scene in the early Woody

142.
See supra note 73.
143.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Njor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." ).
144.
The level of procedural due process may vary depending on the
circumstances. Compare Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369, 373-74 (1979) (holding that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require a right to counsel in cases where
a misdemeanor offense authorizes prison time but no prison time is imposed), with
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (finding a right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases where any prison time is imposed).
145.
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
("Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due
Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.").
146.
For more analysis of the Lochner decision, see supra notes 66-95 and
accompanying text.
147.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Allen comic film Bananas.148 A rebel leader in a small South American
country who has just succeeded in overthrowing the regime becomes drunk
with power and proceeds to proclaim a series of absurd decrees, including
the command that the citizens are now to wear their underwear outside
their other clothing. 149 If such a statute were enforced and challenged in
the United States, a court would not need to discuss at length whether the
individual has a liberty interest in choosing how to wear his underwear. 150
The crux of the question before the court would be the obvious interest in
5
avoiding prison or a fine for violation of a statue that is utterly irrational.' '
The nature of the specific act in question will require an examination to
assess whether it poses a threat to any legitimate state interest,152 but the
act need not be examined to reach the obvious conclusion that an attempt
to criminally punish it constitutes an action by which the state threatens
5

liberty.1 1

The importance of the act being criminalized to the individual and the
degree to which that act is central to the individual's personhood, privacy
or autonomy must be examined to determine whether to impose a
heightened level of scrutiny to the prohibition.15 4 But where the
government will be held to no more than a rational basis test, the central
inquiry is not the importance of the act to the individual, but whether the
government can demonstrate a legitimate justification for banning it.155
What, then, qualifies as a sufficient justification, and perhaps more
importantly, what does not? The classic formula would concede legitimacy
to a government act when it promotes the general welfare, the classic
148.
BANANAS (MGM/United Artists 1971).
Id.
149.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (stating that the
150.
paramount inquiry is whether the law in question is "a fair, reasonable, and
appropriate exercise of the police power of the state").
See id. (holding that one's liberty interest provides protection from the
151.
execution of "unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary" laws).
152.
Id. at 53.
153.
See id. at 56 (explaining that "an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty" is unconstitutional).
154.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (explaining that matters "involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" and that "these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State").
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.2, at 651; see id., at 654-59 (discussing
155.
the legitimate government purpose requirement).
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definition of what early cases called the police power.1 56 But the concept of
the general welfare is not necessarily self-defining. One might argue that
any prohibition enacted by a democratically elected legislature must be in
furtherance of the general welfare. The problem with legislation such as
that depicted in Bananas is that it is imposed by a dictator. 57 A democratic
government would not enact such a statute, and if it did, it would have
acted for some benefit, perhaps not evident to us, that actually did further
social welfare.
But this position, perhaps not far from that of Holmes, 158 has not been
accepted by the Court in recent years.15 9 At the very least, the Court has
held that there are some illegitimate justifications for legislation, despite its
embrace by a majority. 160 Equal protection cases have held that simple
hostility toward, or irrational fear of a group cannot justify statutes
disadvantaging that group, even under an analysis demanding only minimal
scrutiny. 161 Lawrence holds that mere reliance on traditional, and even
morality, by themselves, are
contemporary majoritiarian concepts of 162
insufficient to justify a criminal prohibition.
These negative statements, though helpful, do not give us a wellgrounded theory that will allow us to recognize illegitimate prohibitions
with confidence. Some groups may deserve the hostility of the community
on rational grounds. 163 A vast array of criminal statutes are certainly

See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
156.
See BANANAS (MGM/United Artists 1971).
157.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
158.
that the Supreme Court has allowed state constitutions and laws to "regulate life in
many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or ... tyrannical").
See cases cited supra notes 109-14.
159.
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-36 (1996) (rejecting the
160.
State's asserted rationale that the Colorado law, which discriminated against
homosexuals, protected citizens' freedom of association and was passed out of respect
for citizens who for personal or religious reasons objected to homosexuality); United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1972) (rejecting an asserted
government interest in promulgating the 1964 Food Stamp Act, which was intended to
prevent politically unpopular "hippies" from utilizing food stamp programs).
See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
161.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("'[Tlhe fact that the
162.
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... ' (quoting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the Court justified the
163.
practice of requiring sex offenders, when released from custody, to register their
presence with public officials in the community due to the potential danger of
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consistent with traditional or conventional contemporary morality. 164 A
coherent framework or theory is required if the Lawrence principle, when
applied in other cases, is to deliver coherent and defensible results.
Perhaps the best starting point is the classic harm principle set forth by
nineteenth century liberal and utilitarian thinkers. 65 John Stuart Mill and
others maintained that the only acceptable justification for restraints on
liberty was that the restraint would prevent harm to others.166 We need not
accept, at least at the outset of analysis, this proposition in its full force, but
few would doubt that preventing harm to others is a legitimate justification
for the use of criminal sanctions that restrain liberty. This does, however,
leave open the question of just what constitutes harm. And perhaps more
controversial is whether, in fact, harm to others is the only proper
justification; that is, whether and to what extent government may promote
the general welfare by preventing the individual from harming himself.
These questions have been dealt with at length for centuries, but one
of the most prominent recent efforts is Joel Feinberg's four-volume work
entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. 167 In defending Mills's
harm principle, Feinberg examines, in separate volumes, each of four
categories of justification for criminal sanctions that have been advocated
and accepted by different communities: harm to others, 68 offense to
others, 169 harm to the actor himself, 170 and a fourth category of "harmless

recidivism. Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003).

164.
See discussion infra notes 246-69 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia
sees this fact as fatal to the position of the Court in Lawrence. Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. at 589-90 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
165.

See, e.g., THE CLASSICAL UTILITARIANS:

BENTHAM AND MILL (John

Troyer ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 2003) (describing the utilitarian harm principle through
the writings of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham).
166.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Prometheus Books ed., 1986)
(1859). For example, Mill wrote:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do
so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do
so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him... but not for compelling
him ....

id.
167.

See sources cited supra note 18.

168.
169.

FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS,

supra note 18.

FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS,supra note

18.
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wrongdoing."' 71
Unsurprisingly, Feinberg holds that the prevention of harm to others
is a clearly acceptable use of the criminal law. 72 He devotes his first
volume largely to the most problematic applications of this principle,
posing questions such as whether a failure to prevent harm qualifies as
harm,'173 whether the voluntary consent of the person harmed absolves the
actor,'74 whether one can be harmed posthumously, 17 5 and others. For our
purposes, we need not examine each of these issues, but should note that
Feinberg does not accept "moral harm" as sufficient. 176 Harm to others
requires, in Feinberg's terms, that the harmed person be shown to be worse
'
off in some cognizable way, not merely "worse."177
Feinberg takes issue with some extreme liberals and libertarians in his
second volume, 78 and contends that causing offense to others can be
sufficient to bring the offender within the harm principle. 17 9 In other
words, mental discomfort can legitimately be seen, at some point, to be a

FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18.
170.
171.
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18.
172.
See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 11 (asserting that "it
is legitimate for the state to prohibit conduct that causes serious private harm, or the
unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm to important public institutions and
practices").
173.
See id. at 126-86 (discussing good Samaritan laws, the conflation of active
aid and gratuitous benefit, the difficulty of separating laws requiring minimally decent
acts and those requiring acts exceeding persons' actual moral duties, and the
interference with liberty a law imposing a requirement to act would have).
174.
See id. at 35-36 (asserting that no wrong has occurred if the actor
voluntarily inflicts harm upon himself or freely assumes the risk of harm-causing
activity); id. at 115-17, 215 (discussing the Volenti maxim that a person cannot be
wronged by conduct to which he has consented).
175.
See id. at 79-83 (concluding that death is not necessarily a harm to the
person who dies by comparing the case of a younger, vigorous person who dies with
that of a retired nonagenarian who dies).
176.
Id. at 66.
177.
See id. at 105 (indicating that a harm is a "setting back, thwarting,
impairing, defeating, and so on"). But see generally id. at 31-36 (struggling to define
and classify different types of harms).
178.
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18, at ix-x.
179.
FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 1-3. Feinberg does
limit the offense principle to "serious" offense, and the offense must be caused by
conduct that can be seen as wrongful, in that it can be expected by the actor to cause
such a reaction. Id. In addition, Feinberg maintains that while offense to others can
justify criminal punishment, it generally is of a lesser magnitude than actual harm to
others. Id. at 3.
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harm. 8 ' However, he is careful to circumscribe this conclusion, and draws
largely on the law of nuisance.18' An offensive action may be punished as a
harm where the time, place, or manner of the act is beyond the bounds of
reason, and the unwilling observer's reaction of disgust, shock, or outrage
is itself reasonable. 8 2 Thus, it will be insufficient to invoke this justification
by merely alleging that someone (or the community at large) is offended by
the knowledge that otherwise harmless, though perhaps repulsive, activity
is going on somewhere in private.18 3
In his third volume, Feinberg takes up the subject of legal
paternalism, defined by Mill as the use of a criminal prohibition to "prevent
harm (physical,psychological, or economic) to the actor himself."184 Taking
the classic liberal position, Feinberg rejects the prevention of harm to the
actor himself as a basis for criminal law. 85 However, he draws a line
6
Soft
between what he calls "hard paternalism" and "soft paternalism.',
paternalism, which Feinberg accepts as reasonable and not inconsistent
with liberal support for autonomy, warrants state interference with
dangerous self-regarding behavior "when but only when that conduct is
substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary intervention is necessary to
establish whether it is voluntary or not."187
Because this type of
government act does not seek to veto decisions that are genuinely
autonomous, but merely to assure that they truly are autonomous,
Feinberg concludes that soft paternalism is not clearly paternalistic. 8
Feinberg's fourth volume considers harmless wrongdoing. To clarify,
he restates his definition of "harm" that may be criminalized as physical,
psychological or economic injury, or as he puts it: "harm to one's body,
psyche, or purse."' 89 This definition excludes simple moral harms and in
Feinberg's view, renders unacceptable any attempt to justify a criminal
prohibition simply on the ground that its existence will lead to the
90
elevation of the character of an individual or of society
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5, 7-10.

183.

Id. at 10.

184.

FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF,

185.
186.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 12.

187.

Id.

supra note 18, at 4.

188.
Id.
189.
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18, at xx.
190.
See id. at 277-317 (rejecting the principles of "legal perfectionism" and
"coercion to virtue").
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It is clear that American courts have never adopted in full Feinberg's
conclusions concerning the moral justification of criminal sanctions as
constitutionally mandated legal rules. No one, of course, liberal or
conservative, libertarian or majoritarian, contests the proposition that
demonstrable harm to others should be prohibited. But the proposition
that the law may not act paternalistically to protect one from harming
oneself has never been engraved in constitutional law. The most recent
context in which this point has been illustrated has been the judicial
treatment of cases contending for a right to die or a right to assisted
suicide.' 9' These cases are not without some nods in the direction of a right
of autonomy. The common law right to refuse medical treatment appears
to command support among a majority of the Supreme Court, 192 as does
(although somewhat less clearly) the right to have an advance directive
instructing withdrawal of treatment honored, 193 but the Court has failed to
endorse a positive right to suicide or a right to obtain the assistance of
others in ending one's life. 6 4 The Court's explanation for this refusal
contains significant elements of what Feinberg would characterize as "soft
paternalism.'" 95 The Court is concerned that lifting the bar on assisted
suicide would create too great an opportunity for abuse and for hastening
the death of some who may not actually desire death. 196 Still, at least where
the harm involved is to the actor's "body, psyche, or purse," current
constitutional doctrine 97 has not yet invalidated paternalism as a legitimate

191.
See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
192.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
193.
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I also write separately to emphasize that the Court does
not today decide the issue whether a State must also give effect to the decisions of a
surrogate decisionmaker. In my view, such a duty may well be constitutionally
required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.")
(citation omitted). Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, observed that "[t]he
court did not specifically define what kind of evidence it would consider clear and
convincing, but its general discussion suggests that only a living will or equivalently
formal direction from the patient when competent would meet the standard." Id. at
323 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (upholding a
state's ban on assisted suicide).
195.

See

FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF,

supra note 18, at 12-16 (defining soft

paternalism as the state's "right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct.., when but
only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary").
196.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731-32 ("[T]he state has an
interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled
persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.").
197.
See id. at 731 ("[Tlhe state has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups
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government justification for criminal sanctions. 98 The issue of the
legitimacy of paternalistic justifications is not central to our inquiry into the
significance of Lawrence, however, and it can therefore be set aside.
What is significant and new in Lawrence is the extent to which it
suggests that the Court endorses Feinberg's rejection of "legal moralism,"
initially defined by Feinberg as the proposition that "[i]t can be morally
legitimate to prohibit conduct on the ground that it is inherently immoral,
even though it causes neither harm nor offense to the actor or others."'199
Bowers explicitly endorsed the position that an accurate appraisal of
traditional or majoritarian views on the immorality of an act is sufficient to
legitimate criminalization of that act under low-level rational basis scrutiny,
with no further need to justify the community's view by pointing to
concrete harms flowing from this activity. 00 Lawrence, however, rejects
20
that view. '

To justify a criminal statute by its foundation in majority views of
morality is to essentially argue that its legitimacy under low-level scrutiny is
beyond judicial review. A court could hardly claim the power to declare
that the legislative assessment of what the majority view of morality
entailed was less accurate than the court's own.2 2 While the position that
courts should defer to any legislative judgment that is not an irrefutable
violation of a clear constitutional command has a long history of academic
advocacy, 203 it has never been adopted by the Supreme Court. Apart from

...from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.").

198.
See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 4-8 (describing the
reasoning underlying "legal paternalism" in criminal law).
199.
See FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18, at xix-xx.
Feinberg later redefines "legal moralism" "as the principle that it is always a good
reason in support of criminalizatign that it prevents non-grievance evils or harmless
immoralities." Id. at 324.
200.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188, 190-96 (1986).
201.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73, 578 (2003) (overruling
Bowers after questioning the validity of the assertion that homosexual activity has a
history of being characterized, and actively prosecuted, as criminal conduct).
202.
This problem is heightened by the finality of Supreme Court
determinations. The Canadian constitutional system, in contrast, provides that in a
wide range of instances involving rights claims, legislatures may respond to Supreme
Court decisions invalidating statutes by reenacting the law in question, and the law will
stand, regardless of the Court's decision, for a period of five years. See CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS pt. I, § 33.
203.
See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893) (proposing that "only
...when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but
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a few academic voices, it seems well accepted across the political spectrum
against even the most
that the Court is empowered to assess20legislation
4
open-ended of constitutional commands.
But if we take seriously the position of Justice Harlan in Lochner,
that the government must produce some evidence to support the legitimacy
of criminal legislation, 05 we must then face the question of how much
evidence, and perhaps more significantly, what kind. Justice Harlan's
opinion suggests that the quantum of evidence the state must produce to
satisfy the test of rationality is not great.20 6 Certainly, the proof offered
does not need to satisfy a court that it outweighs the evidence that the
It seems to be, in
prohibition does not further the general welfare.207
evidence law terms, 208 more of a burden of going forward than a burden of
proof.2 09 This seems to be something akin to the deferential standard

have made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational question," should
courts find a statute unconstitutional).
Of course, there is still widespread disagreement concerning how
204.
vigorously the power of judicial review should be exercised, but the fact that the Court
has the power to disagree with legislative determinations concerning such things as due
process and equal protection is firmly established. See generally Symposium: Judicial
Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981) (containing analysis of the
political implications of judicial review by some of the nation's leading constitutional
law scholars).
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68-72 (1905) (Harlan, J.,
205.
dissenting) (asserting that the statute should be upheld because evidence had been
presented that bakers and confectioners who worked excessive hours were prone to
severe health problems, which, in Justice Harlan's view, was sufficient to establish a
connection between the conduct prohibited by the statute and the harm that would
have occurred absent the statute).
See id. at 68 ("If the end which the legislature seeks to accomplish be one
206.
to which its power extends, and if the means employed to that end, although not the
wisest or best, are yet not plainly and palpably unauthorized by law, then the Court
cannot interfere.").

207.
208.

Id.

See FED. R. EVID. 301 (providing that "a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or
meet the presumption, but it does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the
sense of risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast").
See Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. at 68 (noting that the burden of proof
209.
"is upon those who assert [that the statute is] unconstitutional"). Professor Clifford
Fishman provides more information on the distinction between burdens of proof and
burdens of going forward, or to put it differently, burdens of producing evidence and
burdens of persuasion. See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL §§ 3:1-3:45 (7th ed. 1992).
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commonly applied in cases reviewing actions of administrative agencies. 210
More significant, however, is the question of the kind of evidence or
the type of justification put forward. How, in a post-Lawrence legal world,
can we recognize insufficient arguments in favor of a criminal prohibition
based not on the weight of the evidence, but rather on the nature of the
justification? Drawing on Feinberg, we can delineate two types of
insufficient justifications, though whether a particular prohibition falls into
either category will not always be immediately obvious. The first of these
is that the prohibition in question seeks to preserve traditional moral or
cultural practices from erosion or change.211 The second is that the
prohibited act is simply, in some sense, inherently wrong regardless of
whether it has any noticeable affect on others. 212 In Lawrence, there are
overtones of each of these attempted justifications.
Prior to Lawrence, in Romer v. Evans,213 Justice Scalia made clear his

view that constitutional litigation over issues regarding sexual behavior and
the legislation challenged by that litigation was part of a struggle to define
and enforce cultural values.2 14 The context of Scalia's comments in Romer
made it clear that he regards legislation meant to preserve and enforce
these values as legitimate, and not merely reflections of mindless
hostility.215 The defender of the use of criminal sanctions to preserve
210.
While the federal Administrative Procedure Act sets forth both a
standard of "substantial evidence" and one of "arbitrary and capricious" agency action
for judicial review, each is highly deferential. KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 11.1-.5 (3d ed. 1994); see also Ass'n of Data
Processing v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that
"there is no substantive difference between what [the arbitrary and capricious standard]
requires and what would be required by the substantial evidence test").

211.

See generally FEINBERG,

HARMLESS WRONGDOING,

supra note 18, at 39-

80 (discussing the concept of "moral conservatism," "the thesis that it can be morally
legitimate to preserve a society's traditional way of life from radical or essential change
by means of legal coercion").
212.
Id. at 124-75 (discussing strict legal moralism, the view that "true
immoralities .... even when private and harmless, are such evident and odious evils
that they should be forbidden on the ground of their evil alone").
213.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
214.
See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has mistaken a
Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here is not the
manifestation of a 'bare . . . desire to harm' homosexuals, but is rather a modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against
the efforts of a politically powerful minority .. ") (citation omitted).
215.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The obvious point of Justice Scalia's dissent in
Romer is that it is quite legitimate to conduct a "culture war" to preserve traditional
values.
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traditional cultural values will contend that the violation of those norms,
even in private, and the knowledge that they are no longer enforced or
universally subscribed to, will cause these values to erode2 16 If this is true,
one might argue that there is no significant difference between preventing
this from occurring and preventing offense, if not harm, to a majority that
wishes to adhere to long-established values. Offense will occur in the long
run, rather than immediately, but it will occur nonetheless.
This argument overlooks, however, what must be the position of a
society that endorses the concept of liberty generally, and the values
inherent in the First Amendment in particular. Such a society has to be
open to the possibility that majority values will evolve and perhaps even
undergo drastic change. Justice Scalia may be correct in arguing that a
culture war is underway, 217 but there must be ground rules on how that
struggle is conducted.
In this regard, it should once again be noted that we are dealing here
only with criminal prohibitions, the most obvious method of government
depriving a citizen of liberty. Neither the Fourteenth Amendment itself,
nor its interpretation in Lawrence, requires that the majority of citizens,
acting through their representatives, remain entirely neutral on questions
of morality. The majority may seek to persuade, and may provide
incentives for those who choose to act in a particular way, but the use of
criminal sanctions goes too far. It attempts, by coercive means, to freeze
traditional moral concepts in a way that limits not only the liberty of the
individual today, but the liberty of future majorities to define their own
moral conventions. 218 As Feinberg points out, "the vanishing of the New
England theocratic village life-style, the antebellum Southern plantation
way of life, and the double-faced Victorian standards of sexual propriety"
216.
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18, at 43-50 (analyzing
the psychic aggression thesis (the "dubious" belief "that deviations from conventional
morality even in private are threats to the mental health of others"), the social
disintegration thesis (the "even more dubious" belief "that conventional immoralities
threaten every individual with the disintegration of his society and ensuing anarchy"),
and the offense principle (which is opposed to "discreetly private immoralities on the
ground that they would come to be directly offensive anyway, their original privacy not
withstanding") as all being distinct from "moral conservatism").
217.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218.
Thus, to base an argument in favor of coercive enforcement of
majoritarian morality or democratic theory creates a paradox. "Democratic theory
endorses the moral propriety of majority rule only when minorities have been left free
to try to become majorities if they can[;] ... [tihat opportunity is hardly open to the
person whose favored activities are deemed criminal and banned on pain of
punishment." FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18, at 52-53.

HeinOnline -- 53 Drake L. Rev. 265 2004-2005

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 53

were certainly seen at one time to be social evils by those who were
comfortable in these environments. 219 In retrospect, however, most would
consider the abandonment of these norms to be beneficial. Social change
may be resisted by argument, incentives, and nongovernmental social
pressure, but the coercive use of criminal sanctions is contrary to the
basically open society envisioned by the Constitution.
The argument that criminal sanctions can be justified to prevent
social change seen as detrimental has significant flaws, but at least it does
maintain that the prohibited conduct will cause or threaten social harm.
The second attempt at justification of criminal statutes based solely on
moral sentiment would maintain that a demonstration of immediate social
harm is unnecessary. 22 Under this view, conduct may be prohibited simply
because it is clearly contrary to obvious principles of true or objective
221

morality.

This position will often overlap with the position that apparently
harmless wrongdoing will actually threaten the long-term "harm" of
changing commonly accepted norms of social conduct, but it is not
precisely the same. By definition, current social norms are those held by
the majority; a demonstration that those norms are no longer prevalent
effectively rebuts the argument. At least in theory, however, an advocate
of the defense of true or objective morality need not demonstrate majority
support. It would be quite sufficient that an enlightened minority has
succeeded in enlisting the criminal law to coerce others to follow the
proper path.
This "pure moralism" is rare as the sole justification for punishment.
Those who recognize a true objective morality usually rely not only on the
self-evident wrongness of a given act, or on some variation of an argument
from divine command. Instead, they will point to the alleged harms caused
by the immoral act.22 2 In some cases, the harm will be real and
undisputable; in other cases, as noted, it will be a variation on this "harm"
of eroding social norms. But there will be cases in which the act is
performed either in private or only among consenting participants or
observers.

223

219.
Id. at 80.
220.
See id. at 124-75.
221.
Id. at 173-75.
222.
See id. at 124 (defining a "strict moral realist" as one who believes "there
is an can be no harmless wrongdoing").
223.
See id. at 124-25.
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In these situations, the advocate of the enforcement of true morality
may argue that the act in question harms the actor, even if no harm to
another can be demonstrated.22 4 The efficacy of this argument, either in
general or in a particular instance, will depend on the degree to which
paternalism is regarded as legitimate. It is far from clear that the Supreme
Court has determined, or is likely to determine, that government may not
act to protect an individual from harmful consequences of his or her own
acts. 225 Feinberg, on the other hand, regards the rejection of paternalism as
2 26
a legitimate basis for criminal sanctions as fundamental to liberal theory.
While there is certainly a gap between these positions, it may not be as
sharp as it might initially seem. Much of the Supreme Court's refusal to
reject protection of the actor from his or her own actions as a legitimate
basis for criminal punishment seems based on the perceived need to
protect those who are less than fully competent, or particularly vulnerable,
from decisions that can be seen for that reason as less than fully informed
or fully volitional.227 Feinberg does not disagree with the need to protect
those whose behavior "is substantially nonvoluntary, or [to act] when
temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or
not." 22 8 To Feinberg, this is soft paternalism, which in his view is not
paternalism, or at least not the paternalism that he rejects. 229 In light of this
agreement on the legitimacy of government protection of individuals from
their own acts where substantial questions can be raised as to the fully
voluntary nature of those acts, the gap between Feinberg and the current
Supreme Court doctrine shrinks, although in all likelihood it does not
disappear. Situations where someone is acting in ways that present obvious
threats to the actor's health or other interests will raise questions
concerning the voluntary nature of the act; however, where the individual
224.
Among many examples would be the dehumanizing effect on actors
performing in pornographic films or live sex shows. See id. at 126-27.
225.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (upholding a state
law banning assisted suicide); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-83
(1990) (upholding a statute requiring clear and convincing evidence that an
incompetent person's wishes are followed before allowing a surrogate to withdraw
treatment).
226.
See FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18, at 3
("'liberalism' ... rejects the legitimizing principle called 'legal paternalism').
227.
Thus, the more serious the consequences to the actor, the more legitimate
is government supervision to assure that the act is genuinely voluntary. See FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 117-21 (arguing that voluntariness is a "variable
concept" that is dependent "on the nature of the circumstances, the interests at stake,
and the moral or legal purpose to be served").
228.
Id. at 12.

229.

Id.
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is merely acting in a way that, although not presenting any threat to others
falls short of
or the community, merely indicates that the actor's character
230
community norms, criminal punishment will not be justified.
Feinberg rejects what he calls "legal perfectionism" as a proper
justification for criminal sanctions. 23t This doctrine holds that a criminal
prohibition can be justified by the claim "that it will make citizens better
people. 2 32 Once again, Feinberg stresses that he does not reject the
legitimacy of some government role in instilling virtue; education and other
incentive-driven behaviors are entirely proper.23 3 But the use of coercion
not only violates the basic liberty principle that Feinberg defends,234 it is
somewhat paradoxical. Feinberg asserts that coercion to virtue is a
contradiction in terms.235 Coercion can only instill the "virtue" of
obedience to authority; 236 genuine virtues are developed and adopted by
the individual. 237 To be sure, the individual acts within a context of social
falls short of coercion, and the
influence, but ultimately that influence
s
virtuous individual chooses virtue 238
230.
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18, at 118-20.
231.
Id. at 277-311.
232.
Id. at 277. Or, to put it another way, "[a]ccording to . . . legal
perfectionism,' it is a proper aim of the criminal law to perfect the character and
elevate the taste of the citizens who are subject to it." Id.
233.
See id. at 278 ("It also seems undeniable that the state may properly
attempt to promote public virtue and raise the level of excellence throughout society
by such methods as moral and cultural education in the public schools, subsidies to the
arts and sciences, and awards and prizes to virtuous exemplars.").
234.
See id. at 281-82 (asserting that "[it would be manifestly absurd to
threaten people with punishment in order to give them wisdom, style, integrity, or a
better sense of humor" because "then they have in mind only those dispositions of
character that are moral virtues in a familiar stricter sense, but not all of them either[:]
[g]enuine generosity, concern, magnanimity, and courage are not readily produced by a
policeman's billy club or threats of imprisonment"); id. at 318-20 ("defend[ing]
liberalism from the otherwise potent argument of legal paternalists that mere 'liberty'
is value that can sometimes be 'outweighed' by reasonable estimates of the actor's own
good").
235.
See id. at 281-82 ("The only virtue clearly produced by [intimidation],
namely simple obedience, may not in its own right be a moral virtue at all.").
236.
Id. at 282 ("[S]imple obedience .. may not in its own right be a moral
virtue at all.").
Id. at 281.
237.
238.
A strong behaviorist would maintain that all human behavior is
controlled, the only difference being in how open the controls are. ld. at 289.
Feinberg, however, contends that social development of an individual's conscience is
not genuine compulsion. Id. Rather, it is "indistinguishable from genuine selfdetermination, even though the determining self is originally the product of the
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The distinction between acceptable incentivizing measures and
unacceptable coercion is already evident in the Court's approach to
substantive due process cases involving abortion. In these cases addressing
a recognized component of the privacy right, the Court has drawn a
distinction between invalid government prohibition and acceptable39
government acts to provide incentives to choose alternatives to abortion.
Despite strong arguments to the effect that no meaningful distinction can
be drawn between coercion and the manipulation of incentives and
disincentives, and perhaps even between coercion and the expression of
approval or disapproval, 240 constitutional law has consistently maintained a
line between negative rights to be free of government coercion and the
generally rejected concept of positive rights to government assistance in
carrying out one's choices. 4'
Lawrence, then, does not disable government from promoting
traditional or majoritarian views of morality, it merely removes the
criminal law weapon of coercion. Subsequent cases, or cases grounded in
state constitutional provisions, may go further, but Feinberg's principle
does not inevitably lead to the principle, associated most prominently with
external factors that shaped it." Id.
239.
Thus, while the Supreme Court protected a strong version of the abortion
right in the years immediately following Roe, it held that the right has never included
entitlement to equal government subsidy of both abortion and childbirth. See cases
cited supranote 118.
240.
Feinberg discusses the work of behaviorist psychologist B.F. Skinner, who
maintained that all human action was the result of outside control whether obvious or
subtle, whether maintained by punishment (negative reinforcement) or rewards
(positive reinforcement). See FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 18, at
287-94.
241.
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (rejecting the
argument that the denial of public funding for abortions infringes on a constitutional
right); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (refusing to treat poverty as a suspect
classification warranting the application of strict or intermediate scrutiny); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,35 (1973) (holding that there is no
fundamental constitutional right to state-supported education). The United States
Constitution, as written and interpreted, provides less support for positive rights to
government assistance than the constitutions of many other western nations. See, e.g.,
Gerhard Casper, Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism:18th to 20th Century, 1989
Sup. Cr. REV. 311, 325-30 (discussing the American approach to the welfare state as
contrasted with that of France, England, and Germany); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in
Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 523-26, 527-32 (1992)
(contrasting the United States Bill of Rights, which is "a 'charter' of 'negative' liberties,
protecting certain areas of individual freedom from state interference," from postWorld War II European constitutions, which "supplemented traditional negative
liberties with certain affirmative social and economic rights or obligations").
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Ronald Dworkin, that government must maintain 2complete
neutrality on
42
the question of what lifestyles are worthy of respect.
The principle that criminal sanctions may be used to prevent or
punish only harm or offense to others has two sides. It not only provides
reasons for invalidating prohibitions, but also provides justifications for
upholding them. The limits of the principle can be illustrated by examining
the litany of horribles put forward by Justice Scalia in his Lawrence
dissent.2 43 In a widely noted passage, Justice Scalia contends that "[s]tate
laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are . . .
sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral
2
choices." 44

This list is wildly overinclusive. Justice Scalia fails to distinguish
between prohibitions that-while surely consistent with traditional or
conventional morality-satisfy the harm principle, and those that do not.
A closer look at the activities listed by Justice Scalia reveals that they are
by no means all of the same character:
(a) Adultery. Perhaps most obvious of all of the offenses on Justice
Scalia's list, adultery clearly can be seen as harmful to a specific victim: the
betrayed spouse. Thus, the harm principle is easily satisfied here.
(b) Bigamy. Initially, an important distinction must be drawn. The
Lawrence principle and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment do not require that the government provide benefits, only that
it limit its interference with liberty.25 Thus, substantive due process by no
means requires states to recognize plural marriages. 246 The sole question is
242.

See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 179-83 (1978)

(analyzing John Rawls's proposition "that individuals have a right to equal concern and
respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern them").
243.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases that "have relied on the ancient proposition that a governing
majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes
a rational basis for regulation").
244.
Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245.
See id. at 578 ("[Petitioners'] right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their private conduct without intervention
of the government.") (emphasis added).
See generally Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. &
246.
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 353, 357-58, 366-89 (2003) (discussing modern Morman
fundamentalist polygamy, particularly the aspect of teenage plural wives, as a
justification for continued government policy of criminalizing it); Richard A. Vazquez,
Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate
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whether bigamy can be treated as a crime, consistent with the Lawrence
principle. History shows that bigamy is often accompanied by fraud or
coercion. 247 Each of these situations presents an instance of clear harm that
2 48
goes beyond merely offending notions of conventional morality.
Granted, there is no perfect fit between instances of bigamy that include
fraud or coercion, and those that do not. If Lawrence or other cases
imposed a traditional strict scrutiny approach on cases such as this, the
state might not prevail.249 But Lawrence calls only for a determination that
the prohibition is not arbitrary.250 Lawrence and the harm principle pose
no threat to these prohibitions.
(c) Fornication. Here, Justice Scalia has a valid point. After
Lawrence, it is difficult to see how a criminal statute prohibiting
consensual, noncommercial sex, in private, between adults could be
upheld. 51 But this seemed clear well before Lawrence.2 52 It is difficult to
imagine prosecutors attempting to punish these types of acts after Griswold
and Eisenstadt.253 Of course, where one of the qualifications (consensual,
Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern ConstitutionalJurisprudence,
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 225, 253 (2001) (arguing that the judiciary should rely
on the public policy interests of protecting women and children from "the real harms
[they] suffer in polygamous societies," instead of employing "a 'public morality'
rhetoric" when "sustain[ing] criminal bigamy laws against Free Exercise challenges").
247.
See Vazquez, supra note 246, at 239-40 (asserting that criminal bigamy
laws would likely survive strict scrutiny if courts would cease "resorting to 'public
morality' rhetoric in examining" them, and instead focus on "the real public harms in
polygamous communities": sexual assault and fraud).
248.
See id. at 240-44 (providing examples of fraud and assault in polygamous
communities).
Cf. id. at 245-46 (asserting that the closed nature of polygamous
249.
communities insulates the harm to women and children that occurs in such
communities from empirical study, making it difficult to pinpoint a specific harm, in
turn hindering state legislatures from narrowly tailoring a statute to address the
identified harm-fatal in a strict scrutiny analysis).
Or, that it is not a statute that "furthers no legitimate state interest which
250.
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578 (citing that because Lawrence did
251.
not "involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationship where consent might not easily be refused," did not "involve public
conduct or prostitution," and did not "involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter," "the
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual life a crime").
See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
252.
253.
See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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noncommercial, private, adult) is not satisfied, the act may be punished
2 54
because the danger of harm or offense is obvious.
(d) Masturbation. Once
private act of masturbation
Lawrence.251 But, even more
seems clear that this was true
prohibiting masturbation could

again, Justice Scalia seems correct that a
may not be criminally punished after
clearly than in the case of fornication, it
prior to Lawrence.2 56 No criminal statute
satisfy Feinberg's harm principle.

(e) Prostitution. As in the case of bigamy, prostitution will often
present the clear possibility of identifiable harm. Exploitation of women
whose participation may not be voluntary,257 public health concerns, and
other harms may accompany the exchange of sex for money. It is surely
the case that a sub-category of prostitution is free of these threats,25 8 and if
Lawrence imposed a standard of strict scrutiny, Justice Scalia's concern
might be warranted. But Lawrence does not.2 9 While a blanket
related
prohibition of prostitution may be overbroad, it seems sufficiently
260
to identifiable harm beyond moral offense to satisfy Lawrence.

(f) Same-sex marriage. Here, Justice Scalia conflates failure of a state
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578.
254.
255.
Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256.
See id. at 578 ("[lIndividual decisions by married persons, concerning the
intimacies of their physical relationship ...are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to
intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.") (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)).
See generally Jane E. Larson, Prostitution,Labor, and Human Rights, 37
257.
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 673, 678-79 (2004) (discussing the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women and the U.N. Crime Commission in Vienna, which
distinguished women who enter prostitution voluntarily with those who enter
involuntarily); Vednita Carter & Evelina Giobbe, Duet: Prostitution, Racism and
Feminist Discourse, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 49-52 (1999) (discussing the power
imbalance between men and female prostitutes).
See Larson, supra note 257, at 678 (stating that U.N. processes have come
258.
to accept some forms of voluntary prostitution).
259.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558-79 (refusing to hold that the right
to engage in homosexual activity is a fundamental right warranting the application of
strict scrutiny).
260.
Cf. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000) (O'Connor, J.).
Justice O'Connor would have upheld the Pennsylvania law in dispute in City of Erie v.
Pap'sA.M., which barred live nude entertainment, because "'nude live entertainment.

. adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health, safety and welfare by
providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication,
prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, and other deleterious
effects.'" Id. (quoting Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 279 (Pa. 1998)).
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to provide equal access to benefits with criminal punishment. While
Lawrence is surely part of a growing reconsideration by society of its
attitude toward homosexuals, the question of whether same-sex marriage is
constitutionally required is an equal protection issue. 261 Even states
strongly opposed to same-sex marriage do not prosecute same-sex couples
who structure their lives to approximate traditional marriage. As we have
seen, Lawrence does not disable government from all decisions that create
it merely restricts the
incentives for one course of conduct over another,
2 62
use of the coercive force of criminal punishment.
(g) Obscenity. Supreme Court cases dealing with the obscenity issue
actually present further, albeit subtle, support for the proposition that the
Court is moving toward acceptance of the harm principle. The Court's
earliest obscenity cases seemed to accept prevailing notions of the moral
offense presented by the existence of obscenity with little or no
discussion. 263 More recent cases, however, have found it helpful, if not
necessary, to justify the exclusion of obscenity from the protection of the
First Amendment by pointing to the arguable linkage between
pornographic or obscene materials and concrete harms such as crime,
The
exploitation of women, or deterioration of neighborhoods.264
obscenity issue is complicated by the First Amendment concerns that it
implicates; it is questionable whether the linkage between obscenity and
265
identifiable social harm is strong enough to survive heightened scrutiny.
Thus, the Massachusetts case holding that homosexual marriage must be
261.
recognized by the state turned on the court's reading of the state constitution's equal
protection clause, as well as its due process protections. See Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959-70 (Mass. 2003).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 571 ("The issue is whether the
262.
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the criminal law.").
E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) ("Although this is the
263.
first time the question has been squarely presented to this Court. .. expressions found
in numerous opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not
protected by the freedoms of speech and press.").
For example, in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton, the Court cited evidence
264.
of "at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime." Paris v.
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). In cases involving the regulation of
expressive activity not classified as obscene, the Court has pointed to the likelihood of
"negative secondary effects" impacting health, safety and general welfare, as justifying
such regulation. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 290.
When the First Amendment is applied with full force and there has been
265.
no determination that a particular work is obscene, an arguable link between
pornography and violence toward women has been held insufficient to justify a
punitive ordinance. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331-
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But Lawrence does not insist on that level of state justification. By itself it
adds little or nothing to prevailing law on this question.
(h) Adult Incest. Assuming that Justice Scalia is referring here only
to consensual adult activity, it is likely that he is correct. As much as adult
incest is still regarded as repellant, it seems difficult to produce a
convincing rationale for such criminal prohibitions. Once again, however,
this may well have been true prior to Lawrence, simply on the basis of the
Griswold-Eisenstadtline of cases.2 66 As with fornication or masturbation,
there seems little or no actual public or prosecutorial zeal for punishing
67
these acts in contemporary society.
(i) Bestiality. Once again, this presents an issue that is hardly at the
top of the list of concerns for many prosecutors. Nevertheless, it would
seem that possible public health dangers may well satisfy the harm
principle here. In addition, if we include animals within the universe of
those who the state may protect from harm or undue exploitation, a
rational defense of those proclivities is evident.
Justice Scalia severely overstates the impact of the Lawrence
principle, seen as an endorsement of the harm principle, on a wide range of
criminal statutes.268 He fails to distinguish between the vast majority of
criminal statutes that, while surely consistent with traditional or
conventional morality, also serve to guard against harm to "body, psyche,
or purse," and those that do not.269 The relatively small universe of the
latter, which we might designate as purely moral offenses, is indeed on
tenuous constitutional ground, but this can be seen as less of a revolution
than an obvious extension of earlier developments. But the fact that
Lawrence will not lead to massive rewriting of criminal codes does not
mean that it is insignificant. Lawrence does, at least potentially, place
meaningful restrictions on the extent to which legislators may enact
criminal sanctions without doing more than merely responding to public
34 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting an Indianapolis ordinance even though it was limited to

injuries "directly caused by ... pornography").

For a contrasting analysis of these

same issues within a constitutional system that explicitly calls for balancing free speech
concerns with public welfare concerns, see Butler v. The Queen [1992] S.C.R. 452

(Can.).
266.
See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
267.
This is limited, of course, to such activity that remains not only
consensual, but private and noncommercial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walter, 446
N.E.2d 707, 708-09, 711 (Mass. 1983) (affirming a prostitution conviction when the
defendant advertised massages and performed masturbation for a fee).
268.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269.

See FEINBERG, HARMLESSWRONGDOING, supra note 18, at xx.
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sentiment.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Lawrence v. Texas is obviously an extremely significant development
with respect to gay and lesbian rights. But what can we say about its
significance beyond those parameters? What does it add to the overall
pattern of constitutional analysis? At the outset, of course, some degree of
caution is warranted. Past decisions of the Supreme Court have had a
significant impact on American history but do not appear to have left a
lasting imprint on the development of constitutional doctrine apart from
their narrow holdings. Some, like Korematsu v. United States270 have
become anomalies, 271 inconsistent with subsequent developments. Others,
such as Shelley v. Kraemer,272 provided an impetus for subsequent
developments, but are rarely relied on for their underlying reasoning. 273
And still others, including Bush v. Gore, 74 remain as potential sources of
new law, while at the same time have the possibility of becoming mere legal
curiosities in future decades. This history, together with the fact that only
five justices joined the Lawrence majority opinion,275 make sweeping
predictions hazardous.

270.

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (upholding

wartime order excluding Japanese-Americans from designated areas of the west coast);
see supra note 70.

271.

See supra note 70. While Korematsu has never been expressly overruled,

it is instructive that the Supreme Court's most recent reference to it was to cite Justice
Murphy's dissenting opinion. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004).
Justice Scalia recently used a reference to Korematsu as a way to denunciate of the
Court's partial-birth abortion decision in Stenberg v. Carhart,530 U.S. 914 (2000). See
id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I am optimistic enough to believe that, one day,
Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history of this Court's
jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott.").
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4, 23 (1948) (holding that state court
272.
enforcement of private restrictive covenants constitutes state action for purposes of the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 6.4, at 506-07 ("Shelly remains
273.
controversial because ultimately everything can be made state action under it....
[T]he Court only rarely has applied Shelly as a basis for finding state action.").
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000) (invalidating Florida Supreme
274.
Court's order for a manual recount of ballots that did not register a vote for president
in the 2000 presidential election).
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by Justices Stevens,
275.
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003). Justice
O'Connor concurred, but on equal protection grounds, and disagreed with the
majority's overruling of Bowers. Id. at 579, 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Still, there is good reason to believe that Lawrence is more than just a
gay rights decision. To begin with, it is consistent with the recent tendency
of the Court to move away from treating constitutional cases as presenting
a stark choice between granting essentially total deference to legislative
decisions and giving no deference to them at all. While the language of
strict scrutiny or low-level scrutiny persists, it has become clear that each of
these alternatives, along with alternative formulations, such as intermediate
scrutiny, is merely a way of approaching a less than fully determinate
balancing test.27 6 If the Court has become skeptical of Justice Holmes's
position in his Lochner dissent, it has shown little enthusiasm for reviving
Instead, we can see an
the approach of the Lochner majority.
unacknowledged turn to Justice Harlan's brand of balancing.
This approach can be seen in places apart from Fourteenth
Amendment cases. Automatic deference to Congress in defining the scope
of the Commerce Clause is no longer the rule, 277 but neither is a
requirement that Congress go beyond demonstrating a nontrivial link
between its action and commercial activity. 278 The Court's turn to
balancing, however, is most evident in a range of Fourteenth Amendment
cases. 27 9 Lawrence strongly suggests that cases presenting substantive due
process claims will be examined with a degree of balancing that might call
to mind the balancing applied in procedural due process cases, more than
the all-or-nothing approach presented by the fundamental right/no
28 0
fundamental right approach of earlier substantive due process cases.
276.
See id. at 578 (indicating that intimate relationships "'are a form of
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married
persons."') (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). The Court did not use a specific test in analyzing the Texas statute, but
instead held that "[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Id.
277.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 567 (1995) (holding that
Commerce Clause power does not justify federal statute criminalizing the possession of
firearms in a school zone); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 619 (2000)
(holding that Commerce Clause power does not permit Congress to create a federal
civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence).
278.
See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce
Clause After Morrison, 25 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 843, 866 (2000) ("[N]either Lopez
nor Morrison prevent Congress from regulating any activity that involved the exchange
of a single dollar of U.S. currency or even barter." Thus, Congress "may still be able to
ban any violence that has an economic motive or purpose.") (emphasis added).
279.
See supra notes 120-24, 126 and accompanying text.
280.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578 (balancing the rights of individuals
"to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government" against the
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Procedural due process cases are decided under a three-part
balancing test set down by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.28 1 The test,
on its face, seems quite indeterminate, yet case law allows us to identify
some procedural steps which are almost always required, such as a minimal
notice requirement,28 2 and others which are hardly ever required, such as
appointed counsel in non criminal cases.2 83 In other words, a balancing test
will not necessarily lead to an unmanageable degree of uncertainty.
Similarly, balancing Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
and equal protection claims will surely not drastically affect settled law.
We can remain confident that, for example, overt racial discrimination will
continue to be almost always impermissible, and that government
regulation of business will be generally upheld. But Lawrence reminds us
of a burden placed on governments seeking to coerce through the use of
criminal sanctions. Such sanctions must not be arbitrary, but284must be
related to a legitimate government interest in punishing the actor.
A recent Eleventh Circuit case illustrates both the type of statute that
should raise post-Lawrence concern, and also, unfortunately, the reluctance
of at least one circuit to recognize the impact of the Lawrence principle.
In Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama,285 the ACLU, acting on
behalf of several users and vendors, challenged an Alabama statute that
prohibits the commercial distribution of sex toys, that is, "any device
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human
genital organs. ''286 Plaintiffs based their challenge on arguments similar to
in Lawrence, and the district court held the
those that would be advanced
87
statute unconstitutional.
The Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, in a 2-1 decision,288 but perhaps

"further[ing] of [a] legitimate state interest which [could] justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual").
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see supra note 50 (setting
281.
forth the Mathews balancing test).
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
282.
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18,
283.
31 (1981) (holding that due process does not require "the appointment of counsel in
every parental termination proceeding").
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578.
284.
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
285.
id. at 1233; ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (Supp. 2003).
286.
Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev'd sub
287.
nom. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232.
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala, 378 F.3d at 1233, 1250.
288.
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more disturbing than the outcome was the majority's analysis. The
Plaintiffs maintained that the statute violated a "fundamental right [to]
sexual privacy. '289 Finding, quite correctly, that Lawrence rejected strict
291
scrutiny, 29 the court concluded that no such fundamental right existed
and, having done so, upheld the statute with no discussion of whether the
state satisfied the rationality requirement. 292 The Williams majority
29 3
adhered to the rigid fundamental right/complete deference dichotomy.
Dissenting Judge Barkett did recognize the impact of Lawrence. She
wrote: "The doctrine of substantive due process requires, first, that every
law must address in a relevant way only a legitimate governmental
purpose. In other words, no law may be arbitrary and capricious. .... "294
She noted that Alabama presented no justification for the statute beyond
criminalizing activity seen to offend the morality of the majority.2 9 Judge
Barkett recognized the wider impact of Lawrence, but the fact that she
wrote in dissent indicates that it may be some time before that impact is
generally recognized and accepted.
By holding that the state's assertion that a criminal prohibition
accurately reflects the moral sentiment of the community is insufficient to
satisfy the due process clause, the Supreme Court has taken a significant, if
partial, step toward accepting the harm principle of Mill and others, as
elaborated by Joel Feinberg. By no means has the Court gone so far as to
accept all of Feinberg's conclusions. Most significantly, the question of
whether, and to what degree, the state may act to prohibit one from
harming himself or herself remains open to debate.
This is hardly the "massive disruption of the current social order"
envisioned by Justice Scalia. 296 The vast majority of criminal statutes, while
surely resting on moral grounds, can be seen as attempts to prevent harm
or offense, as defined by Feinberg, to individuals or the community at
289.
Id. at 1236.
290.
Id.
291.
See id. at 1239-50 (applying the Washington v. Glucksberg analysis, and
concluding that Lawrence created no additional fundamental right to sexual privacy).
292.
See id. at 1250.
293.
Id. at 1238; see also id. at 1250 ("Once elevated to constitutional status, a
right is effectively removed from the hands of the people and placed into the
guardianship of unelected judges.").
294.
Id. at 1252 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
295.
Id.
296.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 591 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 244-68 and accompanying text (diminishing the list of evils predicted
by Justice Scalia).
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large. By insisting that the government explain the use of coercion by
more than simply pointing to the desire of the majority, Lawrence makes
the rational basis requirement of the Due Process Clause more than a
paper tiger.
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